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Abstract One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off
between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this
trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value
or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide three different characteriza-
tions of egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value
and the equal division solution. First, from the perspective of a variable player set, we
show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, on a
fixed player set, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties.
Finally, towards a strategic foundation, we provide a non-cooperative implementa-
tion for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain
stage of the game. These characterizations discover fundamental differences as well
as intriguing connections between marginalism and egalitarianism.
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1 Introduction
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between mar-
ginalism and egalitarianism. In this paper we consider this issue in the context of
cooperative games with transferable utility. Cooperative games are widely applied in
economic allocation problems such as auction games (see Graham et al. 1990), airport
landing fee problems (see Littlechild and Owen 1973), water distribution problems
(see Ambec and Sprumont 2002), polluted river problems (see Ni and Wang 2007),
sequencing problems (see Curiel et al. 1989) and queueing problems (see Maniquet
2003). For these games the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism can be
seen as the trade-off between allocating according to the Shapley value or the equal
division solution. Both solutions consider situations where eventually the ‘grand coa-
lition’ consisting of all players forms. The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) assigns to
every player its expected marginal contribution assuming that all possible orders of
entrance of the players occur with equal probability. Here, the marginal contribution
of a player to a coalition is the increase in transferable utility when this player joins
the coalition. The marginalist characteristic of the Shapley value is most clearly for-
mulated by Young (1985) who characterized it as the unique solution that is efficient,
symmetric and strongly monotonic. This strong monotonicity states that the payoffs
of a player do not decrease if its marginal contributions to coalitions do not decrease.
Since symmetry (i.e. equal treatment of equals) is usually considered a desirable prop-
erty, and under complete information also efficiency is widely accepted, this result says
that the Shapley value is the only solution in which the utility payoff of a player is
fully determined by its marginal contributions to the transferable utility of coalitions.1
On the other hand, the equal division solution which allocates the worth of the grand
coalition equally among all players, can be seen as the most egalitarian solution for
such games. The trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism can be made by
considering convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution.
This class of solutions is introduced by Joosten (1996) and are called egalitarian Shap-
ley values. Surprisingly, it turns out that these solutions can be characterized by similar
axioms and implementations. We provide three types of results that are very common,
yet distinctive, in game theory: consistency, monotonicity and implementation.2
First, we show that all these solutions satisfy the reduced game consistency that is
used by Sobolev (1973) to characterize the Shapley value. This result is quite intriguing
as these seemingly contrastive solutions have this well-known consistency in common.
In these reduced games, after a particular player leaves the game with its payoff, the
remaining coalitions assume with a probability that is proportional to their cardinality
that the leaving player cooperates with them or not. Reduced game consistency requires
that players respect the recommendations made by the solution in the sense that the
solution assigns to the players in the reduced game the same payoffs as it assigns to
those players in the original game. Sobolev (1973) characterized the Shapley value as
1 As already noticed by Young (1985) it is sufficient to weaken strong monotonicity to marginalism stating
that the payoff of a player in two games is equal if all its marginal contributions are equal in both games.
2 Another ‘tension’ in cooperative games is the one between egalitarianism and participation constraints
as studied in Dutta and Ray (1989).
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the unique solution that satisfies consistency and standardness for two-player games,
the latter axiom meaning that in a two-player game every player earns its own worth
plus half of what remains of the worth of the two-player (‘grand’) coalition. An inspir-
ing result we found is that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy Sobolev’s consistency.
Since the Shapley value is the unique egalitarian Shapley value satisfying standardness
for two-player games, one can deduce that the connection as well as difference among
all egalitarian Shapley values might lie in an alternative standardness for two-player
games. An intuitive way to consider such a standardness is to assign to both players a
uniform fraction α in their singleton worth and distribute the remainder equally among
them. It turns out that for any α ∈ [0, 1] the corresponding egalitarian Shapley value
is characterized by consistency and the corresponding standardness axiom. Since all
egalitarian Shapley values share the same reduced game consistency, the difference
thus boils down to the allocation that is applied in two-player games.
The second characterization is based on monotonicity properties. Above we already
referred to the characterization of the Shapley value by efficiency, symmetry and strong
monotonicity (or marginalism) in Young (1985). Since all egalitarian Shapley values
satisfy efficiency and symmetry, this implies that the Shapley value is the unique
egalitarian Shapley value that is strongly monotonic. However, it turns out that all
egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the weaker property which states that the payoff of a
player does not decrease if its marginal contributions do not decrease and, moreover,
the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ does not decrease. This is a considerable weakening
of the strong monotonicity property. Since the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is what is
to be allocated by any efficient solution, strong monotonicity requires that the payoff
of a player does not decrease if its marginal contributions do not decrease irrespective
of what is to be allocated, which is a very strong requirement. However, if the worth to
be allocated is not decreasing then this requirement on the payoffs seems reasonable
for a marginalistic solution. We show that the class of egalitarian Shapley values is
characterized by this weak monotonicity together with the well-known properties of
efficiency, anonymity and linearity. Although these axioms are logically independent,
we also provide an axiomatization without linearity. Instead of linearity we then use
a weak covariance property stating that only adding a constant to every coalition that
contains a particular player, has the same effect on the payoffs of all other players. This
shows the important result that, although the Shapley value is the only solution in this
class that satisfies strong monotonicity (which expresses marginalism), the egalitarian
Shapley values are characterized using a weaker monotonicity property where besides
the marginal contributions also the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is taken into account.
Whereas the above two characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley values give a
cooperative foundation (on a variable, respectively, fixed player set), our third result
provides a non-cooperative foundation by implementing the egalitarian Shapley val-
ues as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in an extensive form bidding
mechanism. This bidding mechanism generalizes the one for the Shapley value given
in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), differing only in an additional possibility of
breakdown of the negotiations. The implementation result verifies the intuition that
the negotiation outcome tends to be more egalitarian if it has a higher probability of
breakdown.
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Key differences and connections between fundamental concepts and theories may
lie in the underlying details of the relevant notions. In a recent paper, Salles (2008)
develops our understanding of rights and freedom. By replacing liberalism with weak
liberalism, a constructive result is obtained in the context of social decision func-
tions, contrasting to the well-known Sen’s impossibility theorem (1970). In a similar
spirit, our paper presents the above three results to discover the major differences
between marginalism and egalitarianism and also to establish the long neglected close
relationships between them although they look rather far from each other.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some preliminaries on coop-
erative games with transferable utility and solutions, including the egalitarian Shapley
values. In Sect. 3 we provide the characterization using standardness and reduced game
consistency. In Sect. 4 we provide a characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley
values using monotonicity properties. In Sect. 5 we provide an implementation of the
egalitarian Shapley values. Finally, Sect. 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game,
being a pair (N , v), where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of players and v : 2N → IR is a
characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is
called the worth of coalition S. This is the transferable utility that the members of
coalition S can obtain by agreeing to cooperate. We denote the class of all TU-games
by G. A TU-game (N , v) is monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The
unanimity game of coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅, on N is the monotone game (N , uT )
given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. In the sequel we denote
n = |N | for the number of players in N . For generic coalitions S ⊆ N we denote
s = |S|.
A payoff vector of game (N , v) is an n-dimensional real vector x ∈ IRn which
represents a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned by cooperation over the
individual players. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games is a function ψ which
assigns a payoff vector ψ(N , v) ∈ IRn to every TU-game (N , v) ∈ G such that
ψi ({i}, v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ IN. Two well-known solutions are the Shapley value
and the equal division solution. The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is the solution that
assigns to every player i ∈ N in TU-game (N , v) its expected marginal contribution
assuming that all possible orders of entrance of the players to the ‘grand coalition’
occur with equal probability,
Shi (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N
i∈S
(n − s)!(s − 1)!
n! (v(S) − v(S \ {i})) for all i ∈ N .
The equal division solution is the solution that distributes the worth v(N ) of the ‘grand
coalition’ equally among all players and thus assigns to every TU-game (N , v) the
payoff vector
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EDi (N , v) = v(N )
n
for all i ∈ N .
Joosten (1996) introduced a new class of solutions that are obtained as convex com-
binations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. For every α ∈ [0, 1],
he defines the α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα as the solution given by
ϕα(N , v) = αSh(N , v) + (1 − α)ED(N , v).
We refer to a generic α-egalitarian Shapley value as an egalitarian Shapley value.
Some well-known properties of solutions for TU-games are the following. Solution ψ
• is efficient3 if ∑i∈N ψi (N , v) = v(N ) for all (N , v) ∈ G;• is linear if ψ(N , av + bw) = aψ(N , v)+ bψ(N , w) for all (N , v), (N , w) ∈ G,
where av + bw is given by (av + bw)(S) = av(S) + bw(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
• is symmetric if ψi (N , v) = ψ j (N , v) for all (N , v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N such that
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j};
• satisfies anonymity if ψi (N , v) = ψπ(i)(N , πv) for all games (N , v) ∈ G and all
permutations π on N , where game (N , πv) is defined by πv(
⋃
i∈S{π(i)}) = v(S)
for all S ⊆ N ;
• satisfies strong monotonicity if ψi (N , v) ≥ ψi (N , w) for every pair of games
(N , v), (N , w) and i ∈ N such that v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≥ w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S) for
all S ⊆ N \ {i};
• satisfies α-standardness for two-player games, α ∈ [0, 1], if for every (N , v) ∈ G
with N = {i, j}, i = j , it holds that ψi (N , v) = αv({i}) + 12 (v(N ) − αv({i}) −
αv({ j})) = α2 (v({i}) − v({ j})) + 12v(N );• is covariant if ψi (N , w) = aψi (N , v) + b for every (N , v) ∈ G, a ∈ IR and
b ∈ IRn , where w is given by w(S) = av(S) + ∑ j∈S b j for all S ⊆ N .
Specific choices of α ∈ [0, 1] give different versions of standardness for two-
player games as encountered in the literature. Taking α = 1 yields standardness for
two-player games as considered in, e.g. Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989): ψi (N , v) =
1
2v({i})− 12v({ j})+ 12v(N ) = v({i})+ 12 (v(N )−v({i})−v({ j})) with N = {i, j}. Tak-
ing α = 0, yields egalitarian standardness for two-player games: ψi (N , v) = 12v(N )
for i ∈ N .
It is known that the Shapley value satisfies standardness and the equal division solu-
tion satisfies egalitarian standardness for two-player games. Joosten (1996) showed
that for α ∈ [0, 1], the α-egalitarian Shapley value ϕα satisfies the corresponding
α-standardness for two-player games.
3 Consistency
In the literature various reduced game properties are discussed. Suppose that one
player leaves a game with some payoff. Reduced games (in relation to the original
game) describe what games are played by the remaining players, i.e. what is earned by
3 Efficient solutions are often called values.
123
698 R. van den Brink et al.
coalitions of the remaining players after one player has left the game. The worths of
coalitions in the reduced games usually depend on (i) the worths that these coalitions
could earn on their own in the original game, (ii) what these coalitions could earn with
the leaving player and (iii) the payoff with which the leaving player left the game. One
of the oldest reduced games is the following that is introduced by Sobolev (1973).
Definition 3.1 Given game (N , v) ∈ G, player j ∈ N , and efficient payoff vector
x ∈ IRn , the reduced game with respect to j and x is the game (N \ { j}, vx ) given by
vx (S) = s
n − 1 (v(S ∪ { j}) − x j ) +
n − 1 − s
n − 1 v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ { j}.
An intuitive interpretation is as follows. Consider a game (N , v), a payoff vector
x ∈ IRn , and a player j ∈ N . Suppose player j leaves the game. Then, all remaining
players will play a reduced game in relation to the original game, where all subcoali-
tions of N \{ j} need to consider the possible payoffs for them after paying j according
to x . To compute the worth of a coalition S ⊆ N \ { j} in the reduced game, according
to Sobolev (1973), it is assumed that S has two possibilities: it (i) either has the cooper-
ation of the leaving player j , but must pay for j’s payoff and thus earns v(S∪{ j})−x j ,
or (ii) is on its own and earns its own worth v(S). The reason why j is still considered
to have cooperation with a coalition S is due to the idea of the reduced game itself.
Since the reduced game is obtained from the original game by taking into account the
payoff x j offered to j , we need to identify where x j comes from and who should pay
for it. Generally, the payoff x j comes from a cooperation between j and a coalition
of the other players, rather than j herself as otherwise she would simply be offered
v({ j}). Consequently, every coalition S ⊆ N \ { j} in the reduced game assumes that
it cooperates with j with a positive probability which depends on the cardinality of S.
That is, s
n−1 represents the probability that coalition S can have the cooperation of j
and thus earns v(S ∪ { j}) − x j , and with probability 1 − sn−1 = n−1−sn−1 coalition S is
on its own and earns v(S). Naturally, if S = N \ { j}, which implies that all remaining
players of N \{ j} jointly agree to work with j , then for sure the cooperation is realized
and x j is paid by N \ { j}, i.e. vx (N \ { j}) = v(N ) − x j .
Consistency with respect to a particular reduced game means that given a game
(N , v), if x is a solution payoff vector for (N , v), then for every player j ∈ N , the
payoff vector xN\{ j} with payoffs for the players in N \ { j}, must be a solution payoff
vector of the reduced game (N \ { j}, vx ). It is a kind of internal consistency require-
ment to guarantee that players respect the recommendations made by the solution.
In the following we refer to consistency with respect to the reduced game defined in
Definition 3.1 just as consistency.4
Definition 3.2 Let ψ be a solution on G. Solution ψ satisfies consistency on G if and
only if for every (N , v) ∈ G with n ≥ 2, j ∈ N , and x = ψ(N , v), it holds that
ψi (N \ { j}, vx ) = ψi (N , v) for all i ∈ N \ { j}.
4 We only consider the class G of all TU-games. If one considers subclasses C ⊂ G, then in the definition
of consistency one should additionally require that the reduced games (N \ { j}, vx ) also belong to C.
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Sobolev (1973) showed that the Shapley value is the unique solution that satisfies
this consistency and is standard for two-player games. Surprisingly, also the equal
division solution satisfies this consistency. It turns out that this even holds more gen-
eral for all egalitarian Shapley values. To facilitate the proof of this result, we like to
note that one can readily verify that an α-egalitarian Shapley value of a game v can be
expressed as the Shapley value of a modified game that is the corresponding convex
combination of the original game v and the game f (v), where f (v)(S) = v(N ) if
S = N , and f (v)(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N . Note that f (v) is actually v(N ) times the
unanimity game of N , i.e., f (v) = v(N )uN . That is, for every TU game (N , v) and
any α ∈ [0, 1], the egalitarian Shapley value ϕα(N , v) = Sh(N , αv + (1 − α) f (v)).5
Proposition 3.3 Every egalitarian Shapley value ϕα, α ∈ [0, 1], satisfies consistency.
Proof Take j ∈ N , S ⊆ N \ { j} and let x = ϕα(N , v), y = Sh(N , v), and z =
Sh(N , f (v)). (Note that z also equals ED(N , f (v)). Recall that n = |N | and s = |S|.
We have that, for every i ∈ N ,
ϕαi (N \ { j}, vx ) = Shi (N \ { j}, αvx + (1 − α) f (vx ))
= αShi (N \ { j}, vx ) + (1 − α)Shi (N \ { j}, f (vx ))
= αShi (N \ { j}, αvy + (1 − α)vz) + (1 − α)
v(N ) − ϕαj (N , v)
n − 1
= αShi (N \ { j}, vy) + α(1 − α)Shi (N \ { j}, vz − vy)
+(1 − α)v(N ) −
v(N )
n
+ α(v(N )
n
− Sh j (N , v))
n − 1
= αShi (N \ { j}, vy) + (1 − α)v(N ) −
v(N )
n
n − 1
= αShi (N , v) + (1 − α)Shi (N , f (v))
= Shi (N , αv + (1 − α) f (v)) = ϕαi (N , v).
Here, the first and last equalities follow from the definitions of egalitarian Shapley
value and f . The second, fourth and seventh equalities follow from linearity of the
Shapley value. The third equality follows from the definitions of the reduced games
with respect to x, y and z. For the fifth equality, please notice that Shi (N\{ j}, vz −
vy) = Sh j (N ,v)−
v(N )
n
n−1 because by definition of the reduced games, the game (N \
{ j}, vz −vy) is defined by (vz −vy)(N \{ j})= Sh j (N , v)− v(N )n and (vz −vy)(S) =
s
n−1 (Sh j (N , v)− v(N )n ) for all S ⊂ N \ { j}. Since all players in N \ { j} are symmetric
in this game, we know that Shi (N \ { j}, vz − vy) = Sh j (N ,v)−
v(N )
n
n−1 . The sixth equality
follows from the fact that the Shapley value is consistent and by the definition of f .
unionsq
5 We are grateful to the referee for this valuable suggestion that helps a lot in simplifying the corresponding
proofs in the paper and making the results more transparent.
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Sobolev (1973) characterized the Shapley value as the unique solution that satis-
fies consistency and standardness for two-player games. Since in Proposition 3.3 we
showed that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the same consistency, the Shapley
value is the unique egalitarian Shapley value satisfying standardness for two-player
games. Therefore, we need to adapt standardness for two-player games to obtain a
characterization for other (Sobolev) consistent solutions than the Shapley value. An
intuitive way is to assign to both players a uniform fraction in their singleton worth
and distribute the remainder equally among them, as expressed by α-standardness
for two-player games in the previous section. It turns out that every α-egalitarian
Shapley value satisfies the corresponding α-standardness for two-player games. For
any α ∈ [0, 1] these two axioms characterize the corresponding egalitarian Shapley
value.6
Theorem 3.4 Take any α ∈ [0, 1]. A solution ψ satisfies consistency and α-stand-
ardness for two-player games if and only if ψ = ϕα .
Proof Since it is straightforward that ϕα satisfies α-standardness for two-player
games, by Proposition 3.3 we are left to show uniqueness. Suppose that solution ψ sat-
isfies the two properties of the theorem. We will show that ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v) for any
game (N , v) ∈ G. For n = 1, by definition of a solution we have ψi ({i}, v) = v({i})
for all i ∈ IN. For n = 2, α-standardness of ψ and ϕα implies that they are equal. Pro-
ceeding by induction, suppose that ψ(N ′, v′) = ϕα(N ′, v′) whenever 2 ≤ |N ′| < n.
Let x = ψ(N , v) and y = ϕα(N , v). Take any i, j ∈ N , i = j , and consider the
two reduced games (N \ { j}, vx ), (N \ { j}, vy). Then,
xi − yi = ψi (N , v) − ϕαi (N , v)
= ψi (N \ { j}, vx ) − ϕαi (N \ { j}, vy)
= ϕαi (N \ { j}, vx ) − ϕαi (N \ { j}, vy)
= α (Shi (N \ { j}, vx − vy)
) + (1 − α) (Shi (N \ { j}, f (vx ) − f (vy))
)
= α y j − x j
n − 1 + (1 − α)
y j − x j
n − 1 =
y j − x j
n − 1 ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that both solutions ψ and ϕα satisfy
consistency, the third equality follows by the induction hypothesis, and the fourth
equality follows by the definition of ϕα as well as linearity of the Shapley value. For
the fifth equality, one can readily verify that the game (N \ { j}, vx − vy) is defined by
(vx − vy)(N \ { j}) = y j − x j and (vz − vy)(S) = sn−1 (y j − x j ) for all S ⊂ N \ { j}.
Obviously, all players are symmetric in this game. Thus, Shi (N\{ j}, vx−vy) = y j −x jn−1 .
Since this holds for all i, j ∈ N , i = j , and n ≥ 3, it necessarily leads to that
xi − yi = 0 for all i ∈ N , and thus ψ(N , v) = ϕα(N , v). unionsq
6 Uniqueness of a solution satisfying α-standardness for two-player games and consistency also follows
from Yanovskaya and Driessen (2002). We give an explicit proof of uniqueness since this is much shorter
with the explicit reduced game of Sobolev, and gives insight in the particular class of solutions we consider
here.
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In van den Brink and Funaki (2009) it is shown that for two-player games, a solution
satisfies α-standardness for some α ∈ [0, 1] if and only if it is efficient, symmetric
and linear. Hence, by the above theorem the class of α-egalitarian Shapley values is
characterized by consistency, efficiency, symmetry and linearity.
It is important to notice that the consistency condition is not linear for linear and
consistent solutions, meaning that a linear combination of two linear consistent solu-
tions need not be consistent. To show this, consider two solutions, ψ and ϕ, which
satisfy linearity and consistency, and a game (N , v) ∈ G. Putting x = ψ(N , v) and
y = ϕ(N , v), then for j ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1],
(αψ + (1 − α)ϕ)(N , v) = αψ(N , v) + (1 − α)ϕ(N , v)
= αψ(N \ { j}, vx ) + (1 − α)ϕ(N \ { j}, vy). (3.1)
By linearity of (αψ + (1 − α)ϕ), we have (αψ + (1 − α)ϕ)(N , v) = αx + (1 − α)y,
and thus
(αψ + (1 − α)ϕ)(N \ { j}, vαx+(1−α)y) = αψ(N \ { j}, vαx+(1−α)y)
+ (1−α)ϕ(N \ { j}, vαx+(1−α)y). (3.2)
Since, in general, the right hand sides of Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2 are different7, the solution
(αψ + (1 − α)ϕ), in general, does not satisfy consistency. This makes the character-
ization of the egalitarian Shapley values stated in Theorem 3.4 even more surprising.
The reduced game of Sobolev (1973) is not the only reduced game with respect
to which the Shapley value is consistent. For example, the Shapley value satisfies
consistency with respect to the reduced game of Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989).8
However, the Shapley value is the only egalitarian Shapley value that is Hart and Mas-
Colell consistent. Joosten (1996) characterized the α-egalitarian Shapley value using
α-standardness for two-player games and an adapted version of Hart and Mas-Colell’s
reduced game consistency where the reduced game depends on the parameter α. The
main disadvantage of that characterization therefore is that the parameter α appears
both in the standardness and in the reduced game consistency property. However, we
have shown here that all α-egalitarian Shapley values have the same reduced game
consistency property in common when considering Sobolev (1973)’s reduced game.
Theorem 3.4 helps to advance our insight on the fundamental economic and social
concepts of marginalism and egalitarianism. Both seemingly completely opposite
extremes possess the same consistency. The only difference is how we treat the basic
unit of a society, i.e., a situation containing two players only.
7 This is even the case, when vαx+(1−α)y = αvx + (1 − α)vy (which is satisfied by our reduced game),
since the right hand side of Eq. 3.2 becomes α2ψ(N \ { j}, vx )+α(1−α)ψ(N \ { j}, vy)+ (1−α)αϕ(N \
{ j}, vx ) + (1 − α)2ϕ(N \ { j}, vy).
8 In this reduced game it is also possible for coalitions of more than one player to leave the game. For a
given game (N , v) ∈ G with n ≥ 3, a coalition T ⊆ N , and an efficient payoff vector x ∈ IRn , the Hart
and Mas-Colell reduced game (T, vx ) is given by vx (S) = v(S ∪ T c)−∑ j∈T c xT c for all S ⊆ T, S = ∅,
where T c = N \ T .
123
702 R. van den Brink et al.
4 Monotonicity
Several monotonicity properties of solutions have been discussed in the literature. For
example, Young (1985) showed that the Shapley value is characterized by efficiency,
symmetry and strong monotonicity. Since all egalitarian Shapley values are efficient
and symmetric, the Shapley value thus is the only egalitarian Shapley value that sat-
isfies strong monotonicity. On the other hand, van den Brink (2007) characterized
the equal division solution by efficiency, symmetry and coalitional monotonicity9,
and thus the equal division solution is the only egalitarian Shapley value that satisfies
coalitional monotonicity.
Since the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ is what is to be allocated by any efficient
solution, requiring that the payoff of a player does not decrease if its marginal con-
tributions do not decrease (as required by strong monotonicity) irrespective of what
is to be allocated is a very strong requirement. For example, the payoff of a player
does not decrease if its marginal contributions do not decrease even when instead of
allocation a surplus of 100, the players together have to pay a cost of 100. Usually,
in allocation problems also the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ has an effect on the
payoff distribution. However, if we change a game such that not only the marginal
contributions of a player, but also the worth of the ‘grand coalition’ does not decrease,
then requiring that the payoff of that player does not decrease seems reasonable.
Axiom 4.1 (Weak monotonicity) A solution ψ satisfies weak monotonicity if
ψi (N , v) ≥ ψi (N , w) whenever v(N ) ≥ w(N ) and v(S) − v(S \ {i}) ≥ w(S) −
w(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S.
It turns out that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy this weaker monotonicity
property. Moreover, the class of egalitarian Shapley values can be characterized using
this property. To prove this we first show that weak monotonicity and anonymity imply
local monotonicity, meaning that whenever the marginal contributions of a player i
are greater or equal to those of player j in a game, then the payoff of player i is at
least equal to the payoff of player j .
Lemma 4.2 If a solution ψ satisfies weak monotonicity and anonymity, then
ψi (N , v) ≥ ψ j (N , v) for all (N , v) ∈ G and i, j ∈ N such that v(S∪{i}) ≥ v(S∪{ j})
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Proof Let ψ be a solution that satisfies weak monotonicity and anonymity. Take any
game (N , v) ∈ G, and suppose that i and j satisfy v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ { j}) for all
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Consider a permutation π of N such that π(i) = j, π( j) = i, π(k) = k for
k ∈ N \ {i, j}, and denote w(S) = πv(S) for all S ⊆ N . Then
• w(S) = v(S) if i, j ∈ S or S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
• w(S) = v((S ∪ {i}) \ { j}) if j ∈ S ⊆ N \ {i}, and
• w(S) = v((S ∪ { j}) \ {i}) if i ∈ S ⊆ N \ { j}.
9 Solution ψ satisfies coalitional monotonicity if ψi (N , v) ≥ ψi (N , w) for every pair of games
(N , v), (N , w) and i ∈ N such that v(S) ≥ w(S) for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S.
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Take any S ⊆ N such that i ∈ S. If j ∈ S, then we have
(v(S) − v(S \ {i})) − (w(S) − w(S \ {i}))
= (v(S) − v(S \ {i})) − (v(S) − v(S \ { j})) = v(S \ { j}) − v(S \ {i}) ≥ 0.
If S ⊆ N \ { j}, then we have
(v(S) − v(S \ {i})) − (w(S) − w(S \ {i}))
= (v(S) − v(S \ {i})) − (v((S ∪ { j}) \ {i}) − v(S \ {i}))
= v(S) − v((S ∪ { j}) \ {i}) ≥ 0.
Since v(N ) = w(N ), weak monotonicity implies that ψi (N , v) ≥ ψi (N , w). By ano-
nymity we have ψi (N , w) = ψi (N , πv) = ψ j (N , v), and thus ψi (N , v) ≥ ψ j (N , v).
This shows that ψ satisfies local monotonicity. unionsq
Next we state our first main result of this section, characterizing the class of egali-
tarian Shapley values.
Theorem 4.3 A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, linearity, anonymity and weak mono-
tonicity if and only if it is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy these
four properties. Now, suppose that solution ψ satisfies these properties.
For one-player games ({i}, v) the payoff ψi ({i}, v) = v({i}) follows by definition
of a solution.
If (N , v) is a null game given by v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , then efficiency and
anonymity imply that ψi (N , v) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Next, we consider unanimity games (N , uT ) ∈ G, T ⊆ N , T = ∅. We prove
uniqueness for unanimity games (N , uT ) by induction on |T |. First, suppose that
|T | = 1. Anonymity implies that there is a c∗ ∈ IR such that ψ j (N , uT ) = c∗ for all
j ∈ N \ T . For i ∈ T , Lemma 4.2 implies that ψi (N , uT ) ≥ c∗. So, for i ∈ T we can
write ψi (N , uT ) = c∗ + α for some α ≥ 0. For i ∈ T , efficiency then implies that
ψi (N , uT ) = 1 − (n − 1)c∗, and thus α = 1 − (n − 1)c∗ − c∗ = 1 − nc∗. We obtain
c∗ = 1−α
n
, and thus
ψi (N , uT ) =
{
c∗ + α = 1−α
n
+ α if i ∈ T
c∗ = 1−α
n
if i ∈ N \ T, (4.3)
with α ≥ 0. Weak monotonicity and the fact that all players in a null game earn
zero payoff, implies that ψ j (N , uT ) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N \ T , and thus α ≤ 1. Since
EDi (N , uT ) = 1n for all i ∈ N , Shi (N , uT ) = 1 for i ∈ T , and Shi (N , uT ) = 0 for
i ∈ N \ T , with (4.3) we have ψ(N , uT ) = (1 − α)ED(N , uT ) + αSh(N , uT ) =
ϕα(N , uT ), α ∈ [0, 1].
By anonymity, it holds that there is an α ∈ [0, 1] such that ψ(N , uT ) = ϕα(N , uT )
for every T ⊂ N with |T | = 1.
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Now, consider (N , uT ), 2 ≤ |T | < n. Proceeding by induction assume that we
determined ψ(N , uT ′) = ϕα(N , uT ′) for some α ∈ [0, 1] whenever |T ′| < |T |.
If j ∈ N \ T then weak monotonicity implies that ψ j (N , uT ) = ψ j (N , uT \{i})
for any i ∈ T . With the induction hypothesis it then follows that ψ j (N , uT ) =
ψ j (N , uT \{i}) = ϕαj (N , uT \{i}) = 1−αn = ϕαj (N , uT ). With efficiency it then follows
that
∑
i∈T ψi (N , uT ) = 1−
∑
j∈N\T ψ j (N , uT ) = 1− (n −|T |) 1−αn . By anonymity
we then have that ψi (N , uT ) = 1−(n−|T |)
1−α
n|T | = 1−αn + α|T | = (1 − α)EDi (N , uT ) +
αShi (N , uT ) = ϕαi (N , uT ) for i ∈ T . Thus, ψ(N , uT ) = ϕα(N , uT ).
For the unanimity game (N , uN ), anonymity and efficiency imply that ψi (N , v) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N .
For arbitrary (N , v) ∈ G, uniqueness follows from linearity of ψ and the fact that
v = ∑ T⊆N
T =∅
v(T )uT for every (N , v) ∈ G, with v(T ) = ∑H⊆T (−1)|T |−|H |v(H)
the Harsanyi dividend of coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅ (see Harsanyi 1959). unionsq
Note that Theorem 4.3 characterizes the class of egalitarian Shapley values using
axioms that are fully independent of the parameter α. At first sight, it seems that
requiring weak monotonicity and linearity is rather strong since Young (1985) char-
acterized the Shapley value without linearity. However, we argued above that Young’s
strong monotonicity is considerably stronger than our weak monotonicity. In fact, the
four axioms of Theorem 4.3 are logically independent, as shown by the following
alternative solutions:
1. The solution ψ given by ψi (N , v) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (N , v) ∈ G satisfies the
axioms of Theorem 4.3 except efficiency.
2. Consider the solution f given by f (N , v) = Sh(N , v) if v(N ) ≤ 10, and
f (N , v) = ED(N , v) if v(N ) > 10. This solution satisfies the axioms of Theorem
4.3 except linearity.
3. For N ⊂ IN, let n(N ) be the lowest labeled player in N , i.e. i ≥ n(N ) for all
i ∈ N . Then the solution ψ given by ψn(N )(N , v) = v(N ) − ∑i∈N\{n(N )} v({i}),
and ψi (N , v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N \ {n(N )} satisfies the axioms of Theorem 4.3
except anonymity.
4. The CIS-value given by CISi (N , v) = v({i}) + v(N )−
∑
j∈N v({ j})
n
for all i ∈ N
(see Driessen and Funaki 1991) satisfies the axioms of Theorem 4.3 except weak
monotonicity.
Although the four axioms in Theorem 4.3 are logically independent, we want to
search for an axiomatization of the egalitarian Shapley values using weak monoto-
nicity but without linearity. It turns out that for games with at least three players it is
possible by replacing linearity by a weak version of covariance. This weak covariance
states that only adding a constant to every coalition that contains a particular player,
has the same effect on the payoffs of all other players. (Note that covariance implies
that this has no effect on the payoff of other players.)
Axiom 4.4 (Weak covariance) A solution ψ satisfies weak covariance if there is a
c∗ ∈ IR such that ψi (N , v) − ψi (N , w) = c∗ for all i ∈ N \ { j} whenever for some
j ∈ N and c ∈ IR, w is given by w(S) = v(S) + c for all S ⊆ N with j ∈ S, and
w(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ { j}.
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This axiom is also a weak version of fairness as used in van den Brink (2001) to
characterize the Shapley value.10 Although the Shapley value is the only egalitarian
Shapley value that satisfies covariance, all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy weak
covariance. We denote by G3 the class of TU-games with at least three players.
Theorem 4.5 A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, anonymity, weak monotonicity and
weak covariance on G3 if and only if it is an egalitarian Shapley value.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy weak
covariance. Now, suppose that solution ψ satisfies these properties on G3. Again, if
(N , v) is a null game given by v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , then efficiency and anonymity
imply that ψi (N , v) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Next, we show uniqueness for inessential games, i.e. games (N , v) such that v(S) =∑
i∈S v({i}) for all S ⊆ N . For any inessential game (N , v) ∈ G3 define H(N , v) ={ j ∈ N | v({ j}) = 0} being the set of singleton coalitions with non-zero divi-
dend, and h(N , v) = |H(N , v)|. We prove uniqueness by induction on h(N , v). If
h(N , v) = 1 then (N , v) is a unanimity game. Uniqueness of ψ(N , v) follows similar
as shown in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Proceeding by induction, assume that ψ(N , v′)
is uniquely determined whenever h(N , v′) < h(N , v). Then there are least two players
i, j ∈ N with v({i}) = 0 and v({ j}) = 0. Weak covariance implies that for every
g ∈ N \ {i, j} it holds that
ψi (N , v)−ψi (N , v−v({ j})u{ j})=ψg(N , v)−ψg(N , v − v({ j})u{ j}), (4.4)
and
ψ j (N , v)−ψ j (N , v − v({i})u{i})=ψg(N , v)−ψg(N , v−v({i})u{i}). (4.5)
Since h(N , v − v({ j})u{ j}) = h(N , v − v({i})u{i}) = h(N , v) − 1, the pay-
offs ψi (N , v − v({ j})u{ j}), ψg(N , v − v({ j})u{ j}), ψ j (N , v − v({i})u{i}) and
ψg(N , v−v({i})u{i}) are determined by the induction hypothesis. Taking all (n−2)
equations (4.4) (for every g ∈ N \ {i, j}), and taking one equation (4.5) (for some
g ∈ N \ {i, j}), we have (n −2)+1 = n −1 linearly independent equations. Together
with efficiency, i.e.,
∑
g∈N
ψg(N , v) = v(N ),
this yields (n − 1) + 1 = n linearly independent equations in the n unknown payoffs,
and thus ψ(N , v) is uniquely determined.
Now, consider any game (N , v) ∈ G3. For any game (N , v) ∈ G3 define H(N , v) =
{T ⊂ N | v(T ) = 0 and |T | > 1} being the set of coalitions with non-zero dividend
and containing at least two players, and h(N , v) = |H(N , v)|. We prove uniqueness
10 A solution ψ satisfies fairness if ψi (N , v + w) − ψi (N , v) = ψ j (N , v + w) − ψ j (N , v) whenever i
and j are symmetric players in (N , w).
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by induction on h(N , v). If h(N , v) = 0 then (N , v) is an inessential game, and
uniqueness of ψ(N , v) is shown above.
Proceeding by induction, assume that ψ(N , v′) is uniquely determined whenever
h(N , v′) < h(N , v). Let D(N , v) = {i ∈ N | S ∈ H(N , v) ⇒ i ∈ S} be the
set of players that belong to every coalition that has at least two players and non-
zero dividend. Take any i ∈ N \ D(N , v). Then there is an S ∈ H(N , v) such
that i ∈ S. Take any j ∈ N \ {i}, and let w = v + v(S)(u{ j} − uS). Note that
w(S)−w(S \ {i}) = v(S)−v(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N . Since also w(N ) = v(N ), weak
monotonicity implies that
ψi (N , v) = ψi (N , w) = ψi (N , v + v(S)(u{ j} − uS)). (4.6)
Since h(N , v+v(S)(u{ j}−uS)) = h(N , v)−1, the payoff ψi (N , v+v(S)(u{ j}−
uS)), and thus ψi (N , v), is uniquely determined by the induction hypothesis.
Now, we are left to determine ψi (N , v) for i ∈ D(N , v). Let m(v) =
min j∈D(N ,v) v({ j}), and define M(N , v) = { j ∈ D(N , v) | v({ j}) = m(v)}. If
M(N , v) = D(N , v) then all players in D(N , v) are symmetric, and thus anonymity
implies that all ψi (N , v), i ∈ D(N , v), are equal. Since we already determined the
payoffs of players in N \ D(N , v), efficiency determines ψ(N , v).
Proceeding by a second induction, assume that ψ(N , v′) is determined whenever
|M(N , v′)| > |M(N , v)|. Take some j ∈ D(N , v) with v({ j}) > m(v). Let z =
v − (v({ j}) − m(v))u{ j}.
Weak covariance implies that
ψg(N , v)−ψg(N , z)=ψi (N , v)−ψi (N , z) for all g∈ D(N , v) \ { j}, i ∈ N \ D(N , v).
(Note that |D(N , v)| ≥ 2 since otherwise |D(N , v)| = |M(N , v)|.) Since ψi (N , v) is
determined above, and ψ(N , z) is determined by the induction hypothesis, the payoff
ψg(N , v) is determined.
Since we already determined the payoffs ψi (N , w) for all i ∈ N \ D(N , v), effi-
ciency determines ψ j (N , v) = v(N ) − ∑g∈N\{ j} ψg(N , v). unionsq
Logical independence of the four axioms of Theorem 4.5 can be shown by the same
alternative solutions used to show logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.3.
Since the Shapley value is the only egalitarian Shapley value that satisfies covari-
ance, strengthening weak covariance to covariance in Theorem 4.5 yields an axiomat-
ization of the Shapley value using weak monotonicity.
Corollary 4.6 A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, anonymity, weak monotonicity and
covariance on G3 if and only if it is the Shapley value.
Theorem 4.5 characterizes the class of egalitarian Shapley values without linearity
on the class of games with at least three players. Note that weak covariance has no
meaning on the class of two-player games. To include also the two player games we
might add the weak null player out property which is a weak consistency axiom stating
that deleting a null player from a game changes the payoffs of all other players by the
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same amount. For (N , v) ∈ G and T ⊂ N , the restricted game (T, vT ) is given by
vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T .
Axiom 4.7 (Weak null player out property) A solution ψ satisfies the weak null
player out property ifψi (N , v)−ψi (N\{h}, vN\{h}) = ψ j (N , v)−ψ j (N\{h}, vN\{h})
for every i, j ∈ N and h ∈ N \ {i, j} being a null player in (N , v).
This is a weaker version of the null player out property as considered in Derks and
Haller (1999) which states that deleting a null player does not change the payoffs of
the other players. The weak version stated above is used in van den Brink and Funaki
(2009) to characterize a class of equal division solutions.
Theorem 4.8 A solution ψ satisfies efficiency, anonymity, weak monotonicity, weak
covariance and the weak null player out property if and only if it is an egalitarian
Shapley value.
Proof It is straightforward to verify that all egalitarian Shapley values satisfy the weak
null player out property. Now, suppose that solution ψ satisfies these properties on G.
For games on G3 uniqueness follows from Theorem 4.5. For game (N , v) with |N | = 2,
take an h ∈ IN \ {N }, and consider the game (N ∪ {h}, v) given by v(S) = v(S ∩ N )
for all S ⊆ N ∪ {h}. Hence, h is a null player in (N ∪ {h}, v). By Theorem 4.5 the
payoffs in (N ∪ {h}, v) are determined. If N = {i, j} then the weak null player out
property implies that ψi (N ∪ {h}, v)−ψi (N , v) = ψ j (N ∪ {h}, v)−ψ j (N , v). With
efficiency ψ(N , v) is determined. unionsq
Note that in the proof of Theorem 4.8 we use the weak null player out property
only to determine the payoffs for two player games from three player games. For other
games we determine the payoffs by the other axioms as shown in the proof of Theorem
4.5.
We end this section by remarking that the truly interesting aspect behind the above
result is that all these simple and natural properties characterize the whole class of
egalitarian Shapley values. Hence, balancing between marginalism and egalitarian-
ism is equivalent to the issue how monotonic a solution is preferred to be. This also
provides an alternative angle for planners to consider and make social policy.
5 Implementation
In the previous two sections we characterized the egalitarian Shapley values from a
cooperative viewpoint. Next we study these solutions from a non-cooperative perspec-
tive. In the literature various implementations of the Shapley value can be found, see
e.g. Gul (1989), Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
In this section we adapt the last mechanism and obtain the following mechanism that
implements any egalitarian Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome. The connection as well as the difference between our mechanism (imple-
menting egalitarian Shapley values) and others in the literature will be discussed at
the end of the section.
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The bidding mechanism is defined recursively as follows. When there is only one
player, say i , in the game, this player simply gets its stand-alone payoff, v({i}). Given
the rules of the mechanism for games with at most k − 1 < n players, the bidding
game for a set of k players proceeds in rounds. Dependent upon the strategies of the
corresponding players, the bidding game may have up to n rounds, each consisting of
four stages. Let Nt be the player set of the game with which the bidding game of each
round t ∈ {1, ..., n} will start.
Round 1: N1 = N . Go to Stage 1.
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ N makes bids bij ∈ IR for every j = i . For each
i ∈ N , let Bi = ∑ j =i
(
bij − b ji
)
be the net bid of player i measuring
its ‘relative’ willingness to be the proposer. Let i∗1 be the player with the
highest net bid in this round. (In case of a non-unique maximizer we
choose any of these maximal bidders to be the ‘winner’ with equal prob-
ability.) Once the winner i∗1 has been determined, player i∗1 pays every
other player j ∈ N\{i∗1 } its offered bid b
i∗1
j . The ‘winner’ i
∗
1 becomes
the proposer in the next stage. Go to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Player i∗1 proposes an offer y
i∗1
j ∈ IR to every player j = i∗1 . (This offer
is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.) Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: The players other than i∗1 , sequentially, either accept or reject the offer.
If at least one player rejects it, then the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the
offer is accepted. Go to Stage 4.
Stage 4: If the offer is accepted, then each player j ∈ N\{i∗1 } receives y
i∗1
j and
player i∗1 obtainsv(N )−
∑
j =i∗1 y
i∗1
j . Hence, in this case the final payoff to
player j = i∗1 is y
i∗1
j +b
i∗1
j , while player i
∗
1 receives v(N )−
∑
j =i∗1 (y
i∗1
j +
bi
∗
1
j ). Stop.
If the offer is rejected then with probability α ∈ [0, 1] player i∗1 leaves
the game and obtains her stand-alone payoff v({i∗1 }), while the players
in N\{i∗1 } proceed to round 2 to bargain over v(N\{i∗1 }). With proba-
bility (1 − α) ∈ [0, 1] the game breaks down and all players, including
the proposer i∗1 , get zero payoffs at this stage (and thus only the bids of
stage 1 are transferred, i.e. the payoff to player j = i∗1 is b
i∗1
j and the
payoff to the proposer i∗1 is −
∑
j =i∗1 b
i∗1
j .). Stop.
In the following rounds, the stages 1, 2 and 3 are the same as in round 1 but with
the reduced player set where the proposer in the previous round has left. However, at
stage 4 of the following rounds there is no possibility of breakdown. To be complete
we describe the following rounds.
Round t, t ∈ {2, ..., n − 1} : Nt = Nt−1\{i∗t−1}. Go to Stage 1.
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ Nt makes bids bij ∈ IR for every j = i . For each
i ∈ Nt , let Bi = ∑ j∈Nt\{i}
(
bij − b ji
)
, be the net bid of player i .
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Let i∗t be the player with the highest net bid of round t . (In case of
a non-unique maximizer we choose any of these maximal bidders to
be the ‘winner’ with equal probability.) Once the winner i∗t has been
determined, player i∗t pays every other player j ∈ Nt\{i∗t }, its offered
bid bi
∗
t
j . The ‘winner’ i
∗
t becomes the proposer in the next stage. Go
to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Player i∗t proposes an offer y
i∗t
j ∈ IR to every player j ∈ Nt \ {i∗t }.
(This offer is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.) Go to Stage 3.
Stage 3: The players other than i∗t , sequentially, either accept or reject the offer.
If at least one player rejects it, then the offer is rejected. Otherwise,
the offer is accepted. Go to Stage 4.
Stage 4: If the offer is accepted, then each player j ∈ Nt\{i∗t } receives yi
∗
t
j and
player i∗t obtains v(Nt ) −
∑
j∈Nt\{i∗t } y
i∗t
j at this stage. Hence, in this
case the final payoff to player j ∈ Nt \ {i∗t } is yi
∗
t
j + bi
∗
t
j +
∑t−1
k=1 b
i∗k
j ,
while player i∗t receives v(Nt ) −
∑
j∈Nt\{i∗t }(y
i∗t
j + bi
∗
t
j ) +
∑t−1
k=1 b
i∗k
i∗t
.
Stop.
If the offer is rejected then player i∗t leaves the game and obtains its
stand-alone payoff v({i∗t }), while the players in Nt\{i∗t } proceed to
round t + 1 to bargain over v(Nt\{i∗t }).
Round n: Nn = Nn−1\{i∗n−1}. Apparently, Nn is a singleton coalition so that it
is a one-player game in this round. The game immediately stops such that player
i ∈ Nn gets its stand-alone payoff v(Nn). So, its final payoff is v(Nn)+∑n−1k=1 b
i∗k
i .
Note that this bidding mechanism extends that of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) by allowing for the possibility of breakdown after the offer is rejected in the
first round. The option of breakdown after the first round negotiation is very realis-
tic. A conventional explanation is due to the modeling of players’ (im)patience level.
Alternatively, it can also be seen as the uncertainty with respect to the players not
knowing each other or any factors that cause the joint negotiation impossible or too
costly to proceed (for example because they speak different languages) after the first
round. This breakdown occurs with probability 1 − α. In the same spirit, α indicates
how likely the game will continue rather than stop after the first rejection. If the game
does continue (with probability α), then the players agreed that they can negotiate,
and this possibility of breakdown does not occur anymore. Then the whole game can
only be stopped by acceptance of all relevant players in a certain round or rejection
in a two-player bidding subgame. A further discussion relating the breakdown and
continuing probabilities after the first round to real life situations is provided at the
end of this section.
Given the characteristic function v, we can calculate the final payoffs of the play-
ers who are assumed to be risk neutral in the mechanism. In case of rejection in the
first round, the expected final gain of proposer i∗1 is αv({i∗}) −
∑
j =i∗ bi
∗
j , whereas
every other player j = i∗1 finally obtains bi
∗
j plus the expected payoff due to the
contingent (with probability α) outcome of the mechanism continuing with player set
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N\{i∗1 }. In case of acceptance of the proposal in the first round, the final gain of i∗1 is
v(N ) − ∑ j =i∗1 (b
i∗1
j + y
i∗1
j ), whereas the final gain of every player j = i∗1 is b
i∗1
j + y
i∗1
j .
Next we generalize the result of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) who showed
that for α = 1 this bidding mechanism implements the Shapley value for zero-mono-
tonic games. A TU-game (N , v) is zero-monotonic if v(S) ≥ v(S\{i}) + v({i}) for
all S ⊆ N and all i ∈ S. It turns out that for any zero-monotonic game such that the
‘grand coalition’ earns a nonnegative worth, the given bidding mechanism implements
the α-egalitarian Shapley values as subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes. For
T ⊂ N the restricted game (T, vT ) ∈ G is given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T .
Theorem 5.1 Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the bidding continues after rejec-
tion in the first round, and let v ∈ G be a zero monotonic game with v(N ) ≥ 0. Then
the outcome in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the bidding mechanism coincides
with the payoff vector ϕα(N , v).
Proof Let (N , v) be a zero-monotonic game with v(N ) ≥ 0, and let α ∈ [0, 1]. The
proof can be readily constructed by observing the fact that playing the game (N , v) by
the bidding mechanism defined above is ‘effectively equivalent’ to playing the modi-
fied game (N , αv+(1−α) f (v)) by the bidding mechanism defined by Pérez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001).11 Then, by Theorem 1 in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001),
it follows that the SPE outcome of the current mechanism is the Shapley value of the
game αv + (1 − α) f (v), which is ϕα(N , v). unionsq
We like to note that an intriguing implication of the above mechanism and the
implementation result is that the equilibrium outcome is closer to be egalitarian if the
negotiation breakdown occurs more likely, whereas it is closer to be marginalistic if
the negotiation continues. This is fairly consistent to our real life observation. Usu-
ally, when negotiating parties are sufficiently patient, a more competitive outcome is
expected. However, if the time limit is stringent but the cooperative gain is too lucra-
tive to resist, then a more egalitarian rule could be adopted straight away with smooth
consensus.
It may be worth discussing the relationship between our mechanism and others
in the literature. Actually, only few works address the issue of implementing mixed
solutions like the egalitarian Shapley values. Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) discussed
a generalized version of their multilateral bargaining game and found that, for some
θ ∈ (0, 1), if the proposer drops out with probability (1−ρ)θ , whereas each responder
drops out with equal probability (1 − ρ)(1 − θ)/(s − 1),12 then the game implements
the corresponding egalitarian Shapley value with respect to θ in stationary subgame
perfect equilibria. However, we like to point out that this result only obtains the egal-
itarian Shapley value as the equilibrium outcome in expected terms rather than in
actual terms, as the game requires an ex ante probability distribution for players to
be proposer. Moreover, the result relies on the use of two parameters. By contrast,
11 The detailed and complete proof can be obtained from the authors.
12 Here in the bargaining model of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), ρ denotes the probability that the game
will continue with the same set of active players S, i.e., a case where no player drops out, and s denotes the
cardinality of the set of active players.
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the mechanism introduced above implements the value in actual terms, and uses only
one parameter α denoting the probability that the game will continue. Moreover, this
parameter only takes effect once: when the proposal is rejected in the first round. If the
game actually enters the next round, then no breakdown happens and thus no param-
eter will appear thereafter. In this sense, the mechanism of the paper seems to provide
a more clear-cut result and can help to illustrate the relationship between bargaining
equilibrium and negotiation breakdown probability more directly.
In Ju and Wettstein (2009), a renegotiation mechanism is briefly suggested where
the rejected proposer can renegotiate with the accepted proposer of the remaining
players. If no deal is reached in the renegotiation then the previously rejected pro-
poser will be “finally rejected” and get zero payoff. This mechanism implements the
egalitarian Shapley value corresponding to the probability about who has the right to
make the offer in renegotiation. Hence, the result in Ju and Wettstein (2009) discovers
the relationship between equilibrium outcome and power to offer in renegotiation,
whereas our mechanism focusses on a breakdown scenario in bargaining.
We end this section by remarking that the design of the negotiation game and the
corresponding implementation result model features that are relevant for many real
life negotiations. In a multilateral bargaining situation we often see that discussion
may completely stop when an initial proposal is found unacceptable and immediately
turned down by some parties. On the other hand, if the parties agree on the basic
framework, then a detailed arrangement can be finally made through many rounds of
subsequent negotiations. For example, the Bali Roadmap basically makes the nations
agree to continue for further detailed negotiations, and after this ‘first round’ the
game enters a no breakdown subsequent two-year process towards the 2009 United
Nations Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen (despite the not so satisfying deal
made so far). An alternative example is the joint pay negotiation among several unions
and employers in a sector. Sometimes we do see that negotiation immediately breaks
down. But, when the parties went through the very difficult first round, negotiation
usually moves on to a settlement, although it may take some time. This paper provides
a basic mechanism which can serve as a reference point for modeling and analyzing
such negotiations. Many variations in real practice could lead to interesting studies,
such as taking account of outside options and even retaliation strategies in multilateral
negotiation.
6 Alternative characterizations and conclusion
In this paper we formulated the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism in
cooperative games by considering convex combinations of the Shapley value and the
equal division solution. We provided three main characterizations of these egalitarian
Shapley values by consistency, monotonicity (both cooperative) and implementation
(non-cooperative). Since these important types of properties were shared in common
by these solutions, we consider the egalitarian Shapley values as an important concept
to make the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism.
Other axiomatizations of the Shapley value can or have been generalized for egali-
tarian Shapley values. For example, it is obvious that ϕα is characterized by efficiency,
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symmetry, linearity and, instead of the null player property, requiring the α-egalitarian
null player property stating that ψi (N , v) = (1 − α)v(N )n , α ∈ [0, 1], for every null
player i in game (N , v). This is shown by Joosten (1996) who also provides axiomati-
zations using a modified balanced contribution property (Myerson 1980), a modified
potential and a modified reduced game consistency (Hart and Mas-Colell 1989).
Also, we can generalize the recursive formula of Maschler and Owen (1989), yield-
ing
ϕαi (N , v) =
1
n
∑
j =i
ϕαi (N\{ j}, vN\{ j})
+ 1
n
(
v(N ) − αv(N\{i}) − (1 − α)
∑
j =i v(N\{ j})
n − 1
)
, for all i ∈ N .
Taking α = 1 yields the recursive formula of the Shapley value given in Maschler and
Owen (1989).
Malawski (2004) obtains the egalitarian Shapley values by a procedure where for
every order of entrance to the ‘grand coalition’ player i ∈ N gets a share α in its mar-
ginal contribution and the predecessors of i equally share the remainder of i’s marginal
contribution.13 Taking the average over all orders of entrance yields the correspond-
ing α-egalitarian Shapley value as expected payoffs. This heuristic approach can be
viewed as a procedural interpretation on how agents take their social responsibilities
in an egalitarian sense (like volunteer, donation, charity, etc.) while their contributions
are remunerated on a marginalistic basis. Hence, it further shows that the egalitar-
ian Shapley values provide a measure of balancing marginalism and egalitarianism.
In a similar spirit, Ju et al. (2007) allocate for every order of entrance the surplus
v(S) − v(S \ {i}) − v({i}) instead of the marginal contribution among the entrant i
and its predecessor, and assign the worth v({i}) fully to player i . This yields the con-
vex combinations of the Shapley value and the CIS-value14, the so-called generalized
consensus values, as expected payoffs. For characterizations and implementations of
generalized consensus values, we refer to Ju et al. (2007) and Ju and Wettstein (2009).
The CIS-value is an egalitarian solution which is computed above the disagreement
point (i.e., players’ stand-alone payoffs) when the game is superadditive. Although the
generalized consensus values may look quite similar to the egalitarian Shapley values,
their axiomatic characterizations are rather different. For example, all generalized
consensus values satisfy standardness for two-player games, but the Shapley value
is the only generalized consensus value satisfying Sobolev (1973)’s reduced game
consistency. On the other hand, in this paper we showed that all egalitarian Shapley
values satisfy Sobolev’s reduced game consistency, but the Shapley value is the only
‘standard’ solution in this class. We characterized all egalitarian Shapley values using
a paramatrized standardness.
13 We remark that Malawski’s result is more general than just considering this procedure.
14 The CIS-value (see Driessen and Funaki 1991), also called the equal surplus solution, is given by
C I Si (N , v) = v({i}) + v(N )−
∑
j∈N v({ j})
n for all i ∈ N .
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As mentioned at the end of Sect. 3, Joosten (1996) axiomatizes the class of egal-
itarian Shapley values by a parametrized standardness for two-player games, and a
paramatrized Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game consistency. The main disadvantage
thus is that both axioms are paramatrized, while in our axiomatization all egalitarian
Shapley values satisfy the same Sobolev reduced game consistency, and differ only in
the specific α-standardness for two player games that is applied.
Axiomatic comparisons between various equal division solutions have been made
by van den Brink and Funaki (2009) who consider a class of equal surplus sharing
solutions that includes the equal division solution, the CIS-value, the ENSC-value (i.e.
the dual of the CIS-value) and all their convex combinations. Further generalizations
of the egalitarian Shapley values and generalized consensus values consider convex
combinations of any of these equal surplus sharing solutions with the Shapley value
(or even the more general semi-values, see Dubey et al. (1981)).
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